CHAPTER 5
Currency War II (1967–1987)
“The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”
U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally to foreign finance ministers, 1971
“I don’t give a shit about the lira.”
President Richard M. Nixon, 1972
As World War II wound down, the major Allied economic powers, led by the United States and England, planned for a new world monetary order intended to avoid the mistakes of Versailles and the interwar period. These plans were given final shape at the Bretton Woods Conference held in New Hampshire in July 1944. The result was a set of rules, norms and institutions that shaped the international monetary system for the next three decades.
The Bretton Woods era, 1944 to 1973, while punctuated by several recessions, was on the whole a period of currency stability, low inflation, low unemployment, high growth and rising real incomes. This period was, in almost every respect, the opposite of the CWI period, 1921–1936. Under Bretton Woods, the international monetary system was anchored to gold through a U.S. dollar freely convertible into gold by trading partners at $35 per ounce and with other currencies indirectly anchored to gold through fixed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. Short-term lending to particular countries in the event of trade deficits would be provided by the International Monetary Fund. Countries could only devalue their currencies with IMF permission and that would generally be granted only in cases of persistent trade deficits accompanied by high inflation. Although conceived in the form of a grand international agreement, the Bretton Woods structure was dictated almost single-handedly by the United States at a time when U.S. military and economic power, relative to the rest of the world, was at a height not seen again until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Despite the persistence of Bretton Woods into the 1970s, the seeds of Currency War II were sown in the mid- to late 1960s. One can date the beginning of CWII from 1967, while its antecedents lie in the 1964 landslide election of Lyndon B. Johnson and his “guns and butter” platform. The guns referred to the war in Vietnam and the butter referred to the Great Society social programs, including the war on poverty.
Although the United States had maintained a military presence in Vietnam since 1950, the first large-scale combat troop deployments took place in 1965, escalating the costs of the war effort. The Democratic landslide in the 1964 election resulted in a new Congress that convened in January 1965, and Johnson’s State of the Union address that month marked the unofficial launch of the full-scale Great Society agenda.
This convergence of the costs of escalation in Vietnam and the Great Society in early 1965 marked the real turning away from America’s successful postwar economic policies. However, it would take several years for those costs to become apparent. America had built up a reservoir of economic strength at home and political goodwill abroad and that reservoir now slowly began to be drained.
At first, it seemed that the United States could afford both guns and butter. The Kennedy tax cuts, signed by President Johnson shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, had given a boost to the economy. Gross domestic product rose over 5 percent in the first year of the tax cuts and growth averaged over 4.8 percent annually during the Kennedy-Johnson years. But almost from the start, inflation accelerated in the face of the twin budget and trade deficits that Johnson’s policies engendered.
Inflation, measured year over year, almost doubled from an acceptable 1.9 percent in 1965 to a more threatening 3.5 percent in 1966. Inflation then ran out of control for twenty years. It was not until 1986 that inflation returned to the level of just over 1 percent. In one incredible five-year stretch from 1977 to 1981, cumulative inflation was over 50 percent; the value of the dollar was cut in half.
U.S. citizens in this period made the same analytic mistake as their counterparts in Weimar Germany had in 1921. Their initial perception was that prices were going up; what was really happening was that the currency was collapsing. Higher prices are the symptom, not the cause, of currency collapse. The arc of Currency War II is really the arc of U.S. dollar inflation and the decline of the dollar.
Despite the centrality of U.S. policies and U.S. inflation to the course of CWII, the opening shots were fired not in the United States but in Britain, where a sterling crisis had been brewing since 1964 and came to a boil in 1967 with the first major currency devaluation since Bretton Woods. While sterling was less significant than the dollar in the Bretton Woods system, it was still an important reserve and trade currency. In 1945, UK pounds sterling comprised a larger percentage of global reserves—the combined holdings of all central banks—than the dollar. This position deteriorated steadily, and by 1965 only 26 percent of global reserves were in sterling. The British balance of payments had been deteriorating since the early 1960s, but grew sharply negative in late 1964.
Instability in sterling arose not only because of short-term trade imbalances but because of the global imbalance between the total sterling reserves held outside Britain and the dollar and gold reserves available inside Britain to redeem those external balances. In the mid-1960s there were about four times as many external sterling claims as internal reserves. This situation was highly unstable and made Britain vulnerable to a run on the bank if sterling holders tried to redeem sterling for dollars or gold en masse. A variety of techniques was orchestrated to support sterling and keep the sterling bears off balance, including international lines of credit, swap lines with the New York Fed, a UK austerity package and surprise currency market interventions. But the problem remained.
Three minor sterling crises arose between 1964 and 1966, but were eventually subdued. A fourth sterling crisis, in mid-1967, however, proved fatal to sterling parity. Numerous factors contributed to the timing, including closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Six-Day War between the Arabs and Israel and the expectation that the UK might be required to devalue in order to join the European Economic Community. Inflation was now on the rise in the United Kingdom as it was in the United States. In the UK, inflation was rationalized as necessary to combat rising unemployment, but its impact on the value of the currency was devastating. After an unsuccessful effort to fend off continued selling pressure, sterling formally devalued against the dollar on November 18, 1967, from $2.80 to $2.40 per pound sterling, a 14.3 percent devaluation.
The first significant crack in the Bretton Woods facade had now appeared after twenty years of success in maintaining fixed exchange rates and price stability. If the UK could devalue, so could others. U.S. officials had worked hard to prevent the devaluation of sterling, fearing the dollar would be the next currency to come under pressure. Their fears would soon be realized. The United States was experiencing the same combination of trade deficits and inflation that had unhinged sterling, with one crucial difference. Under Bretton Woods, the value of the dollar was not linked to other currencies but to gold. A devaluation of the dollar therefore meant an upward revaluation in the dollar price of gold. Buying gold was the logical trade if you expected dollar devaluation, so speculators turned their attention to the London gold market.
Since 1961, the United States and other leading economic powers had operated the London Gold Pool, essentially a price-fixing open market operation in which participants combined their gold and dollar reserve resources to maintain the market price of gold at the Bretton Woods parity of $35 per ounce. The Gold Pool included the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, with the United States providing 50 percent of the resources and the remainder divided among the other seven members. The pool was partly a response to an outbreak of panic buying of gold in 1960, which had temporarily driven the market price of gold up to $40 per ounce. The Gold Pool was both a buyer and a seller; it would buy on price dips and sell into rallies in order to maintain the $35 price. But by 1965 the pool was almost exclusively a seller.
